In Lloyd Jones v City of Red Bud, (Arbitrator Dibble) 2003, employee was a police officer with a history of heart disease. Employee responded to a domestic disturbance and after talking to two teenage girls for 20 minutes , employee collapsed and was pronounced dead as a result of a myocardial infarction. Arbitrator Dibble denied the claim on the basis that his death did not arise out of and in the scope of employment and he was not subject to any unusual stress at the time of his collapse.
In Macko, dec. v BBL Services, (LIRC), 1/01, the employee established long work hours, stressful deadlines which represented "a substantial factor" in the cause of fatal heart attack. Doctors are: P: Ludbrook; D: Schuman. (ALJ Schwendemann)
In Nesbitz v Tri-State Motor Co., (LIRC), 2001, claimant"s testimony alone, without back-up medical causation testimony is insufficient to establish medical causation between two heart attacks and the work.
In Schulte v Ardeth and Air Management Supply Co., (LIRC) 4/27/01, the Commission affirmed death benefit when evidence showed blunt force trauma to decedent's chest causing a tearing and hemopericardium, was sufficient to cause death.
In Jobe v Engineered Environmental Products, (LIRC), 8/22/00, (ALJ House), Employer liable for PTD when claimant, working in his home, suffered heart attack from two stressful phone calls. The Court awarded future medical including use of medicine to control triglycerides and cholesterol. Plaintiff doctor, voc. rehab person: Koprivica, Abrams (Voc. Rehab)
In Deal v Joplin Anesthesia Associates, (LIRC), 7/99, claimant suffered a fatal heart attack at home after he had completed a 12 hour shift, The Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant had experienced stressful activity at work which triggered or precipitated a new stage or pathology or dysfunction in the underlying coronary artery disease and hastened or accelerated the pathology which lead to a sudden cardiac death. The Commission ruled 2-1 that the claimant had provided substantial and competent evidence to support a finding that the claimant?s heart attack arose out of and in the course of employment.
(See also Gander v Shelby County, infra, on an interesting case of notice and heart attack.)
In Gausling v United Industries, 998 S.W.2d 133 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999), the Commission held and the Court of Appeals affirmed that the employee?s heart attack was a spontaneous event in the natural history of his underlying coronary artery disease and work was not a substantial factor in causing it.
In McNelly v Baldor Electric, (LIRC), 9/9/99, A woman suffered a heart attack in the recovery room following surgery for a work-related shoulder injury. The medical testimony was that her shoulder surgery precipitated the heart attack and was a "natural and probable consequence of the compensable injury", and the employer was required to pay the costs of treatment of the heart attack, including resulting by-pass surgery. THE EMPLOYER WAS ALSO ASSESSED THE WOMAN'S "COSTS" OF PROCEEDING, WHICH INCLUDED ATTORNEY'S FEES for unjustifiably refusing to pay the costs of treatment in spite of medical opinions received almost immediately that the attack was precipitated by the shoulder surgery.