(The provisions for Compromise Settlements in a lump sum are set forth in Section 287.390 RSMo.)
In Yerington v La-Z-Boy, 2004 WL 115832 (Mo.App.S.D. 2004), employee filed action against employer for retaliatory discharge. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit holding that the stipulation for compromise settlement had effect of releasing any civil claims against employer for retaliatory discharge when the employer included an amendment in the settlement agreement which stated that "this release does not include any claims the former employee may have against former employer other than under the Workers' Compensation Act." The Court of Appeals reversed holding that the provision was ambiguous so as to warrant the admission of parol evidence to determine the parties' real intent of the stipulation.
In Totten v Treasurer of the State, 116 S.W.3d 624 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003), employee appeals Commission decision denying claim against Second Injury Fund and failing to consider whether claimant was permanently and totally disabled. Claimant entered into a settlement agreement with employer in which the Second Injury Fund was not a party and the amount stated to be paid in the agreement was labeled "open." The employee entered the settlement agreement into evidence as primae facie evidence of a work related accident and that the agreement was also binding on the Second Injury Fund. The Commission found that it was not a work-related accident and held that the settlement agreement was not binding on the Second Injury Fund because it was not a party to that agreement. The mere admission into evidence of the settlement agreement did not bind the Second Injury Fund to its terms. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
In Morton v KD Christian Construction, Inc. and Treasurer of Missouri (LIRC) 3/11/02, the SIF argued that because settlement between claimant and employer was for compensation in excess of 400 weeks, claimant was actually receiving PTD benefits from employer/insurer.
This argument was disallowed, the Commission stating that benefits paid under settlement, rather than under an award, to close out all issues, and can in fact be in excess of 400 weeks if the parties so agree.
In Contract Freighters v Fisher, 13 S.W.3d 720 (Mo.App.S.D. 2000) claimant alleged that he and employer had an agreement before the workers' compensation settlement to reduce the amount of the workers' compensation settlement with the additional agreement that the employer would reduce it's subrogation amount recoverable under the formula in the Ruediger decision, by either 2/3 or ?, dependant upon the dollar recovery in the third-party case.
The settlement stipulation was silent on any such agreement, and the matter was remanded to the Commission to determine the true facts.
(Subrogation is a "tricky" area. If there are any agreements as to waiver of all or part of the subrogation rights, it should set forth in explicit detail in the settlement stipulations.)
In Schneidler v Feeters Grain & Supply, 24 S.W.3d 739 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000), where the terms of a compromise settlement stated that the employer and insurer shall pay and reimburse claimant for all future medical expenses, prosthetic expenses and prosthetic care arising from the accident, this gave the employee the license to select her or his own medical provider. The language of the settlement did not state that the employee must obtain the employer/insurer's approval before they are obligated to pay the expenses. There was no other language limiting the selection of medical care in the settlement stipulation.